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Abstract 
Military intervention into the affairs of other states has historically been justified by the 
United States of America with reference to human rights. It is called humanitarian 
intervention. This article examines the operation of human rights discourse in justifying 
such intervention. It argues that the conflation of national self-interest and collective 
self-defence, which is allowed in jus ad bellum discourse and is built into the UN Legal 
and executive architecture, allows for intervening states to present military actions that 
afford them strategic gains and commercial opportunity as altruistic acts. Support, 
weak resistance, or acquiescence to such action by the UN and the press allows for 
such actions to acquire popular legitimacy, and this article examines how the human 
rights discourse provides an argumentative framework to articulate such legitimacy. In 
its critical analysis of analytical tools put forward by Simma and Cassese, the article 
concludes that the conduct of intervening states post bellum should attract as much 
legal scrutiny as the initial intervention, and that the use of human rights to justify 
interventions that are acquisitive in motive undermines the purpose and operations of 
human rights as a driver for positive change in the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW Volume 4 2018 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to examine how the doctrine of human rights is used to 
justify military humanitarian intervention by the United States of America (US 
hereafter) into other sovereign states, and to critically consider how a set of mixed 
motives (combining altruism and self-interest) or cloaked motives (self-interest 
masquerading as altruism) affect the credibility and efficacy of human rights as 
championed and encoded into law by the United Nations (UN hereafter). I begin by 
framing the problem as it has been set out by a range of scholars, establishing both a 
domestic and an international motive for a misrepresentation of the true motives for 
humanitarian intervention. I then balance one polemical critique of US interventionist 
and non-interventionist policy from Jean Bricmont1 with other examinations which 
examine institutional entrenched thinking in the UN and a statistical analysis of foreign 
intervention. The essay continues with analysis of how US national interest may be 
said to be intertwined with humanitarian intervention, with reference to the realist 
theory of international relations and two of its more prominent American exponents. I 
also discuss how a contemporary idea of the historic recoupment of war costs from a 
beaten foe might justify neoliberal US expansion into other territories. The next section 
deals with the arguments of defence of national interest and collective self-defence 
that might be deployed as jus ad bellum in relation to foreign intervention, and explores 
why such reasons may not be considered sufficient by US policy-makers. I then deal 
with the ironies and unfairness present in the United Nations and international justice 
framework in general, arguing that human rights as a UN project was undermined at 
its very inception by the “victors’ justice” and apparent hypocrisy of the Security 
                                                          
1 Jean Bricmont. Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War, (Monthly Review Press 
2006). 30. 
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Council “Permanent Five”, of which the US is one member. The final section in the 
main body of the essay expands on the reasons for war given by George Bush Jr. and 
Tony Blair in 2003, and analyses the worth of Simma’s ‘almost legal’ argument2 and 
Cassese’s tests for avoiding exploitative interventions.3 Finally, I will conclude that 
human rights interventionism can be, and is, misused to thinly veil neoliberal 
commercial and strategic expansion by the US. I also conclude that the international 
system is rigged in favour of the US or other powerful states behaving similarly, and 
that the safeguards that international law affords to check such behaviour are 
circumvented with relative ease. 
 
Ennoblement through propaganda? 
Eliot Cohen wrote in 1986 that the American public ‘pilloried’ officers returning from 
the Vietnam War as ‘mass murderers, incompetents or both’, and that as a 
consequence, ‘the military leadership has determined never again to fight a war with 
public backing of the fullest kind’.4 Cohen argues that the military officers’ concern is 
understandable but misguided, since any conflict that the US engages in is likely to 
involve political interference, not just armed conflict, and thereby the desired public 
support will be hard to establish.5 I argue a government can hardly expect to generate 
public support for an armed conflict if it announces that the objective is to gain territory, 
to secure oil reserves, or to gain influence. According to Bricmont, it follows that cynical 
aims must be presented as altruistic in nature – there must be an exculpatory 
                                                          
2 Ciaran Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention, (Hart Publishing 2013). 15-16. 
3 Antonio Cassese, “Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?” European Journal of International Law 
1999 25. 
4 Eliot Cohen. “Constraints on America’s Conduct of Small Wars.” Miller, Steven E. (editor). 
Conventional Forces and American Defence Policy, (Princeton University Press 1986) 294. 
5 Ibid n4, 294. 
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narrative.6 Emphasising the plight of the target country’s citizens and the armed forces’ 
intention to liberate them, remove the despotic leader from power and democratise the 
country has a far greater chance of gaining public support, since this narrative 
ennobles the mission and legitimises the glory of its success. I argue that the discourse 
of human rights is therefore a convenient framework around which to construct and 
deploy an argument that can justify intervention for more acquisitive or strategic 
reasons. Indeed, Noam Chomsky sees little value in such discourse, taking the 
reductive view that ‘human rights have purely instrumental value in the political culture; 
they provide a useful tool for propaganda, nothing more’,7 and adding ‘it is not…that 
the United States is unique in this contempt for international law… Rather, it is more 
powerful, and therefore more free to do what it wishes’.8 The misuse of the human 
rights doctrine was clearly observed or anticipated by the United Nations since – as 
Malcolm Shaw states, unilateral intervention is not favoured, ‘primarily because it 
might be used to justify interventions by more forceful states into the territories of 
weaker states’.9 Anne Orford laments that the ‘revolutionary potential of human rights 
is radically circumscribed when rights become an apology for state violence’,10 which 
outlines the danger to the efficacy and legitimacy of human rights as a project and as 
a progression for humanity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Ibid n1, 30. 
7 Noam Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New, (Pluto Press 1997). 133. 
8 Ibid n7, 221. 
9 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge University Press 2008, 6th edition). 1156. 
10 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, (Cambridge University Press 2003). 187. 
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Three critiques of intervention policy 
In commenting on the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Jean Bricmont opines that 
‘mainstream discourse uses non-intervention in situations where (intervention) might 
have been justified…to prepare public opinion to accept other interventions that do 
take place but in very different circumstances,’11 adding that this is done to overcome 
public reluctance for their armies to engage in ‘foreign adventures.’12 I take this to 
mean that the public are led to assume from their government’s selectivity, that the 
decision-makers only choose to intervene when human rights abuses in a situation 
are particularly severe, and show restraint when they are not. Barnett and Finnemore 
take a more evidence-based approach, asserting that the UN Secretariat viewed the 
conflict as a civil war where there was no moral basis for intervention, and did not 
deviate from that position in spite of evidence of genocide.13 Therefore, whilst Bricmont 
blames an unnamed cynical global elite who have the will and power to influence 
mainstream discourse through both the presence and the absence of an action, 
Barnett and Finnemore understand the lack of intervention as an example of 
‘premature cognitive closure’.14 Whilst Bricmont’s argument at first appears somewhat 
paranoid and lacking in evidence in its assumption of the willingness of the elite to 
manipulate popular opinion, the two differing positions can be reconciled by 
considering that intervention requires the commitment of willing states, and it might be 
inferred that there was no willingness amongst United Nations Security Council (UNSC 
hereafter) members or the Secretariat to intervene. Perhaps the strongest evidence to 
support Bricmont’s idea of the cynical manipulation of the human rights discourse to 
                                                          
11 Ibid n1, 51. 
12 Ibid n1, 52. 
13 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organisations in Global 
Politics, (Cornell University Press 2004) 121-123. 
14 Ibid n13, 150. 
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advance a US neo-colonial agenda is to be found when examining the human rights 
abuses its government has not sought to address, such as in East Timor, Zimbabwe, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire. Through analysis of collected data regarding 
foreign interventions conducted by third-party states, Bove, Gleditsch and Sekeris 
have  proven that intervention in oil-rich countries where there is a situation of civil war 
is 100 times more likely than in countries that do not produce oil.15 Whilst the authors 
caution against the cynical acceptance of conspiracy theories about governments’ true 
motives, they nonetheless clearly show that oil-dependent states such as the US and 
its traditional ally the UK generally only intervene in states that are oil-producers.16 
They also point out that the US has in its foreign policy a history of either supporting 
or failing to challenge autocratic rulers in some states whilst emphasising 
democratisation in others,17 which clearly subverts claims made by George Bush Jr. 
about wanting to bring democracy to Iraq. Bove, Gleditsch and Sekeris’ findings tend 
to lend the weight of empirical evidence to the polemical, unsubstantiated claims made 
by Bricmont and – earlier in the essay – Chomsky, although in my view Bricmont’s 
claim that governments use non-intervention as a deliberate policy to give legitimacy 
to intervention is unlikely. It seems far more likely that they simply choose which 
countries to intervene in based on what other benefits there may be. In the next 
section, I will discuss how such thinking is in line with the foreign policy preferences of 
Kissinger and Weinberger. 
 
 
                                                          
15 Vincenzo Bove, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Petros G. Sekeris, ‘“Oil above Water”: Economic 
Interdependence and Third Party Intervention.’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 60(7). (Sage 
Publications 2016). 1270.  
16 Ibid n15, 1270. 
17 Ibid n15, 1273. 
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Humanitarian intervention as a neoliberal Trojan Horse 
In acknowledging that oil companies were lobbying the UK government months before 
the decision to go to war in Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock has said in interview that ‘oil 
was not a reason for going to war, never was’, but concedes that ‘the fact that (oil) 
contracts were an interesting part of the new Iraq was something to compete with the 
Americans for’.18 E-mails between Hillary Clinton and her confidante Sidney 
Blumenthal disclosed via the WikiLeaks website in 2016 suggest that within days of 
the Libyan revolution in 2011, the British and French leaders who had (together with 
US and Canadian allies) led a UN-authorised coalition to aid the rebels, were 
impressing upon the newly-installed Libyan government the expectation that their 
countries’ help be rewarded tangibly with lucrative, favourable oil contracts.19  
It must be accepted that alongside its cost to human life, war entails a huge 
financial cost, and it might be argued that provided states entering a conflict do so in 
adherence to the established principles of the jus ad bellum doctrine, they have a 
moral right to recoup the costs of war from their foes – this is established in precedence 
by both of the World Wars. Since the foes in the global War on Terror are not 
accountable or identifiable as states, it would be difficult to recoup costs from them, 
but I argue a war fought in defence of the rights of a country’s oppressed citizens 
enables the victorious antagonists to justify neoliberal commercial ventures as a 
recoupment of the costs of war. Coining the term “disaster capitalism”,20 Naomi Klein 
has persuasively documented exploitative and cynical commercial practices employed 
by US governments, commercial companies and development agencies in the wake 
                                                          
18 Sir Jeremy Greenstock, interviewed on BBC HardTalk, 16 July 2016, BBC World Service radio, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p040kt9y.  
19 WikiLeaks website, “Hillary Clinton e-mail archive.” WikiLeaks 2016. Accessed 06/05/2017. 
Available at https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/12900.  
20 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (Random House of Canada, 
reprinted 2008) 
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of international humanitarian aid in Haiti, and this practice is also documented by 
Orford.21 Since similar practices can be justified in war contexts as a recoupment of 
costs, it might follow that some exploitation of commercial potential in order to begin 
to recoup the costs of the venture is also justifiable in the case of humanitarian 
intervention. However, it must be acknowledged that in order for an intervention to be 
truly in the spirit of humanitarianism, recoupment of costs through exploitation of the 
resources of the country to whom aid has been given must be an afterthought and not 
the primary, or even secondary intention. An international scramble for oil rights and 
other commercial advantages, whether during an intervention or immediately following 
it, instantly undermines the nobility of the intervention, and invites cynicism.  
The dominant theory of international relations that has been followed by such 
ubiquitous practitioners of US foreign policy as Henry Kissinger is that of realism, and 
it is a realist principle that engaging in a war for any reason other than sovereign self-
interest is foolhardy. Kissinger strove to end America’s ‘crusading’ and ground its 
foreign policy in ‘national interest’,22 and later Caspar Weinberger also conducted 
foreign policy based on the principle that the US should not enter a war unless doing 
so was in its national interest.23 To the realist, a wholly altruistic intervention to protect 
the human rights of another state’s citizens, an intervention which had no attendant 
strategic benefit to the intervening state, would be an unthinkable act of hubris. If we 
accept that the violation of another state’s sovereign borders to protect its citizens from 
abuses can be justified by international human rights law, and that the law encourages 
such an act only when conducted in the spirit of altruism or the collective defence of 
the rights of fellow human beings, we must conclude that according to realist theory, 
                                                          
21 Ibid n10, 188. 
22 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Little, Brown and Company 1981). 981 
23 William Shawcross, Deliver Us From Evil: Warlords & Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict, 
(Bloomsbury Publishing 2000). 102. 
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intervention to protect the human rights of another state’s citizens is incompatible with 
prudent foreign policy. However, realism (as described by Richard Ned Lebow) is 
complex enough to recognise the contradiction that although the international arena 
is a ‘brutal’ self-help system, ‘power is most readily transformed into influence when it 
is both masked and embedded in a generally accepted system of norms’.24 Using 
Lebow’s thinking, I therefore argue that it is unrealistic to expect a state whose foreign 
policy is designed to consolidate its power and influence in the international arena to 
engage in an expensive altruistic enterprise without the expectation of some return on 
its investment. In my view the conception of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
had at its core the idea that when the behaviour of humans in a position of power 
towards humans who are not in a position of power falls woefully and deliberately 
below a certain agreed level, all other humans are degraded by the act and must rally 
to remedy the problem and restore the human condition. However, I argue that when 
the costs of foreign military intervention are borne in mind, asserting such a duty on 
states appears unrealistic. Those states who volunteer to defend human rights in 
foreign countries can only prudently do so if by acting, they gain significantly for 
themselves. When this thinking is considered alongside the compelling statistic for 
likelihood of intervention in oil-producing countries given by Bove, Gleditsch and 
Sekeris,25 it is suggested that for foreign policy makers in the US and its coalition 
partners, restoring the human condition by redressing a perceived evil act is not worth 
the expense unless that expense is outweighed by commercial or geostrategic 
opportunity. Pollis and Schwab go further in characterising the relationship between 
human rights and US foreign policy as symbiotic, an expansion of American values 
                                                          
24 Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Realism’. Chapter in International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity. Dunne, Kurki, Smith (editors), (Oxford University Press 2013, 3rd edition). 59-61. 
25 Ibid n15, 1270. 
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(Manifest Destiny) across the world. They assert ‘the financial marketplace, US foreign 
policy and human rights are all interrelated, increasing (the country’s) already 
enormous power in insinuating its authority and leverage worldwide’.26 This affords an 
interesting and worrying construction of neoliberalism in the global marketplace as the 
literal expression of American-ness, and humanitarian intervention as the instrument 
by which US power-brokers seek to achieve the Americanisation of the world, although 
the authors’ evidence given to support such a sinister idea of US motivation is not 
persuasive. Rather, the evidence suggests that US foreign policy has shrewdly utilised 
human rights as a justification for its global strategy, but without conflating the two or 
purporting that they are part of the same project.  
 
Lawfulness and approval 
If the reader accepts the charge that the US and other states have engaged in war 
that was ostensibly instigated to protect the human rights of subjects of another state 
but was in fact motivated partly or entirely by the prospect of strategic gain or the 
maintenance of a preferred status quo, it might at first be supposed that it did so 
because acting for strategic gain or to maintain a balance of power is unlawful. 
However, as Yoram Dinstein has pointed out, the doctrines of self-defence and of 
collective self-defence as those terms are used in Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter are sufficiently broad and ill-defined to allow states to justify an aggressive act 
in order to protect security interests that might be intangible, such as influence, or to 
prevent a perceived foe from gaining a greater regional influence (such as in the case 
of the US military intervention into the civil war in Vietnam).27 Dinstein also cites part 
                                                          
26 Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, Human Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities, (Rienner 
2000). 214. 
27 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, (Cambridge University Press 2012, 5th edition). 
278-280. 
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of the International Court of Justice decision in the Nicaragua case – that the US’ claim 
to have acted against Nicaragua to protect El Salvador was not made out because El 
Salvador had not requested help – as a ratification of a broad definition of acceptable 
collective self-defence,28 and we can infer that the echoes of this decision lent 
legitimacy to the US conception of the War on Terror begun in 2001 – taking the fight 
to the enemy in his hiding places before he attacks again – which although 
controversial and widely challenged by scholars has never been subject of a legal 
challenge at the International Court of Justice.29  
This gives rise to a question: why deceitfully rely on the human rights narrative 
when there exists a precedent in international law for the lawfulness of pre-emptive 
defence and for defence of sovereign interests, including intangible interests? Why not 
simply invoke the national sovereign prerogative to defend US interests wherever in 
the world they may be? My view is that there are two factors which taken together 
provide an answer to that question. Both are questions of legitimacy, the first 
international and the second domestic. A noble defence of the human rights of 
oppressed people, no matter how improbable that narrative might seem to some, 
nonetheless lends a legitimacy (as a “just war”) to the enterprise, which can lead to 
easier coalition-building and a consensus of approval or acquiescence in the 
international community, and to approval and patriotic fervour domestically. Chomsky 
implies that citizens of the US are uncritical of their government’s hypocritical policy of 
ignoring some articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights whilst decrying 
autocratic states that adopt the same policy,30 and Bricmont states that the US free 
                                                          
28 Ibid n27, 282.  
29 Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror.” Notre Dame Law School 
Scholarly Works. Paper 648.  
30 Ibid 7, 219-220. 
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press are remarkably ‘uniform’ in their coverage of foreign policy.31 If Chomsky is 
correct that US citizens do not challenge their government’s alleged hypocrisy, and 
Bricmont is correct that the US press are reluctant to publicly challenge foreign policy 
decisions, it would follow that provided a set of motivations for military action contains 
at least a veneer of nobility, the boast of a just cause, the action may proceed largely 
unchallenged by the electorate. Conversely, a war for influence – as touched upon in 
the Elliot Cohen quote discussed earlier in this article - is unlikely to engender the 
necessary public backing, since it lacks the necessary heroism. Whilst Dinstein’s 
assertion may hold true in terms of the defence of national interests as jus ad bellum 
being defensible in law, international and domestic opinion and the wish to avoid public 
condemnation from peer states and the electorate is no doubt a prime motivating factor 
in the citing of a humanitarian cause for a self-interested action. Christopher Hill states 
that ‘world opinion means something to those that participate professionally in 
international affairs’, adding that such concern demonstrates the internalisation of 
‘certain common values’.32 It is argued that when the US engages in an intervention 
which could be said to contain a mix of causes, altruism and self-interest together in 
the same project, the altruistic part of that mix provides a kind of ‘plausible deniability’ 
to the decision-makers to any future charge of aggression. This plausible deniability is 
as useful when dealing with criticism domestically as it is when dealing with the 
condemnation of international peers.  
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Ibid n3, 69. 
32 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (Palgrave Macmillan 2003). 179. 
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Equality championed by hegemons 
The language of human rights is far too easily twisted to justify missions that cloak 
other objectives, and far from its ideal role as a watchdog against such perverse 
misuse of the rights encoded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United 
Nations has instead enabled such endeavours, such as in the case of the assistance 
given to the Libyan revolution in 2011. The structure and existence of the UNSC 
‘Permanent Five’ as an ‘A-team’ of hegemonic powers inevitably consolidates their 
hegemony, and enables a legitimisation of those states’ programmes that other states 
cannot enjoy. It can be argued that the non-intervention principle that was stated and 
restated since the inception of the United Nations has not been adhered to as it should, 
and the enforcement mechanisms for the resolution of disputes (the International 
Court of Justice) and the prosecutions of war crimes (the International Criminal Court 
- ICC) at The Hague are relatively weak because they depend on the consent of states 
to submit to their jurisdiction and judgement. Whilst the ICC is ostensibly independent 
from the UNSC, under the Rome Statute the UNSC can request a stay of any 
proceedings intended to be held there indefinitely.33 Despite its position as global 
hegemon and its internal and external self-image as champion of freedom and 
democracy and defender of the weak, the US is nonetheless currently not a signatory 
to the Rome Statute and therefore does not fall within ICC jurisdiction. A UN resolution 
denouncing and condemning a state or non-state regime for human rights abuses may 
be used to justify military intervention on humanitarian grounds (once peaceful means 
have been exhausted or discounted), yet because member states cannot be obliged 
to intervene, they are able to ‘cherry-pick’ which conflicts they wish to involve 
themselves in. If we accept that significant human rights abuses can justify the 
                                                          
33 Sandy Ghandhi, International Human Rights Documents, (Blackstone’s 2012, 8th edition). 156. 
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violation of a state’s sovereign borders and aggressive military action in defence of 
that state’s subjects, the fact that states who present themselves as champions of 
human rights only intervene in conflicts where there are commercial opportunities or 
other geostrategic gains to be made significantly undermines the spirit and the efficacy 
of the human rights project as an endeavour. Furthermore, if conflicts are only being 
joined or begun by intervening states in order to gain power, the differences in relative 
power that exist between intervening states and the states who lack the resources to 
intervene will grow further. Since the concept of equality is the keystone of human 
rights, such a consolidation of inequality among states through selective intervention 
motivated by the will to acquire power is (I argue) a perversion of the noble intentions 
of the Universal Declaration. Since the structure of the United Nations and its organs 
afford preferential conditions to hegemonic states, such a perversion cannot be 
punished. I argue that the legitimacy and efficacy of codified human rights is therefore 
undermined by some of the states involved in the codification process.  
 
Victors’ justice and the impunity of powerful states 
The grounds given by Tony Blair and George Bush Jnr. to justify entry into Iraq in 2003 
included a combination of pre-emptive self-defence (both from Saddam’s regime, 
which was purportedly in possession of chemical weapons, and Islamist terrorism, 
which the US asserted was linked to Saddam) and humanitarian intervention, together 
with the self-appointed prerogative to enforce UN resolutions with which Iraq had failed 
to comply.34 Whatever the truth of the pre-emptive self-defence argument (which is 
not the business of this article to examine), the human rights argument was marshalled 
around the idea of Saddam having used chemical weapons against his own people. 
                                                          
34 Alina Kaczorowska, Public International Law (Blackstone’s 2005, 3rd edition). 432-437. 
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Those involved in the decision to wage war were therefore able to use a defence of 
the Iraqi people’s rights to life and to be free from torture as justifications for their 
actions. The doctrine of human rights can be construed in this context as an enabling 
framework through which to eschew the non-intervention principle that is central to 
customary international law (encoded as article 2(4) of the UN Charter),35 and which 
according to Osterud is ‘the supreme norm of the UN… (and) of the international 
order’.36  
Bellamy sets out the four key jus ad bellum principles, the first and second of 
which are “right intention” and “just cause”.37 In the case of Iraq, setting out the case 
for war by reference to human rights allowed the antagonists to satisfy both these 
criteria. Human rights discourse allows leaders to present themselves as concerned 
citizens of the world, protecting the weak against their oppressors. War and other 
interventions into another state’s sovereign territory are thus overtly justified by a state 
or coalition’s declared obligation to act as Samaritan, establishing a “right intention” 
with a “just cause”. As Kaczorowska has said, in the case of the Iraq invasion, the US 
and UK self-authorised war without backing from the UNSC,38 and the UNSC 
Permanent Five’s veto powers and influence over proxy and client states means that 
they are more able to block any action against them, and thus ensure their international 
impunity more broadly. The Permanent Five are the “victors” of WWII. I argue that 
installing themselves at the United Nations’ inception as a higher echelon within the 
organisation, with a right of veto, sets them apart from the other member states in such 
a way as to render their flagship project of the Universal Declaration hypocritical. A 
                                                          
35 Ibid 2. 11. 
36 Oyvind Osterud, “Sovereign Statehood and National Self-Determination: A World Order Dilemma” 
in Subduing Sovereignty, Heiberg, Marianne (editor) (Pinter Publishers 1994). 28-30. 
37 Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars, (Polity 2006). 122-123. 
38 Ibid 35, 432. 
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power of veto in United Nations Security Council decision-making gives the Permanent 
Five a greater degree of autonomy than other member states, and helps to ensure 
their impunity if they are later associated with crimes against humanity. The champions 
of equality therefore sought to give themselves an advantage over potential 
competitors, even as they espoused the universality of their values by 
‘enshrining…protection of human rights…within the normative framework of 
international law’.39 As Ciaran Burke points out, this rendering of the human rights 
project, rigged to ensure the impunity of those UN members most likely to abuse its 
principles, is all the more ironic for the fact that it was ‘a favourite excuse of Hitler to 
put forward mistreatment of minorities as an excuse for military invasion’.40 It could be 
said that as the victors of the most destructive conflict in history, with a unique 
opportunity to forge a brave new world that ensured Hitler’s tyrannical rule could not 
be repeated by another despot, and to correct the mistakes of the League of Nations, 
the Permanent Five instead ought to have placed themselves wholly, enthusiastically 
and inescapably under the jurisdiction of the law they created. Burke cites Bruno 
Simma’s argument that humanitarian intervention is ‘almost legal’,41 and we might 
draw the conclusion that if a powerful state (or coalition of states) engages in such an 
intervention with a justifying argument that puts their action within touching distance 
of legality, any international zeal to challenge or prosecute such an action will wither 
at the root. This principle can be seen in the example of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
Tony Blair and George Bush Jnr’s argument that they were enforcing a number of 
UNSC Resolutions which called on Saddam to surrender weapons and allow 
inspection could be said to render their action ‘almost legal’, lacking only the necessary 
                                                          
39 Ibid n2, 8. 
40 Ibid n2, 14. 
41 Ibid n2, 15 – 16. 
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permission from the Security Council to enforce their Resolutions militarily. Add to this 
their purported horror at the plight of Iraqi citizens living under Saddam’s regime, and 
their will to protect those citizens’ human rights, and the argument could be made that 
the action is within touching distance of being legal and therefore meets Simma’s test. 
Antonio Cassese rightly warns that ‘a Pandora’s box may be opened’ when powerful 
states learn that they can act in this way with impunity.42 The post-invasion commercial 
exploitation of Iraq’s oil industry is made more difficult to accept because Blair and 
Bush advanced an ethical argument as a justification for bypassing lawful authority.  
Given that the UNSC cannot be relied on as a measure of moral justifiability, it 
may be wise to consider alternatives. Cassese proposes that a humanitarian 
intervention might be justified without UNSC backing if certain criteria are satisfied. 
Amongst others, these include the condition that the intervention must be made by a 
coalition of states, not one state acting unilaterally, and the condition that armed force 
must be used only to stop the human rights atrocity.43 In my view, Cassese’s argument 
is flawed because although he only allows an intervention in cases of the most 
egregious abuses, his test does not cater for the conduct of post-intervention 
peacekeeping and nation-building, during which the self-interest of the intervening 
states can be more subtly masked. A coalition of states might enter a country 
ostensibly to prevent the torture and murder of thousands of civilians, thereby 
protecting their Article 2 and 3 UNDHR rights and satisfying Cassese’s test, but can 
then justify staying as an occupying force to protect those same citizens’ economic 
rights and right to self-autonomy by assuming and handing over control of their 
industries and natural resources, naturally under conditions favourable to themselves. 
                                                          
42 Ibid n3, 25 
43 Ibid n3,. Summarised by Ciaran Burke, Ibid 2. 23. 
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Indeed, Malcolm Shaw suggests that the expectation of post-intervention 
peacebuilding is one that has been imposed externally by the UN in order to ‘minimise 
the motives of the intervening powers’, but I argue that it presents an even greater 
opportunity for commercial and strategic exploitation than the initial intervention does, 
as we see with the case of Libya.44 In my view, Cassese’s proposal fails to address 
the latent problem with humanitarian intervention as it is practised by powerful states 
and coalitions of states, namely that altruism and self-interest, which should be 
considered as incompatible concepts, are in fact presented as concomitant. As we see 
from Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s interview and Sidney Blumenthal’s e-mail (see above), 
this can be done without any acknowledgement of irony or contradiction. 
 
Conclusion 
US foreign policy has unapologetically placed national interest at the top of its agenda, 
yet human rights abuses provide an opportunity to expand into foreign territory through 
humanitarian intervention, one which allows for the circumvention of what are 
inadequate safeguards against such action conceived and enacted by the United 
Nations. The charge made by Bricmont and Chomsky that the US and other powerful 
states cloak acquisitive foreign adventures in the thin veil of humanitarian intervention 
is borne out by statistical fact. Such duality in the reasons for going to war allows for 
leaders to enjoy a plausible deniability when the charge of aggression is made. 
Furthermore, constructing a pre-emptive defence against any such charge by citing 
humanitarianism and collective defence as jus ad bellum (making it ‘almost legal’) 
appears to choke any international will to prosecute the US for transgressions against 
international law, as does the structural inadequacy and built-in impunity of the UN 
                                                          
44 Ibid 9, 1158. 
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system. Future safeguards that are conceived to prevent humanitarianism being 
abused as a reason for violating another state’s sovereignty will need to consider 
intervening states’ conduct post-invasion rather than simply at the point of invasion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
